

# *Individual Narration of The Hague in Memoirs and Beyond*

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HOMER SEMINAR: THE HAGUE SUMMIT AND EUROPEAN NARRATIVES

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DENNIS HÖFER, PATRICK KETTENBACH, SIMON ODROWSKI

# Memoirs as Sources for Research


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- Form of narrative writing about particular event
- Written in the 1<sup>st</sup> person point of view
- About the author's experience more than about the event itself
- Primary sources → provide first-hand testimony or direct evidence
- Author's thoughts and feelings, meaning and interpretation → difference in time between the event and the time of writing



# *1. Jean Monnet*

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# Biography

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- Started to travel the world after secondary school to sell his father's brandy
- Organized supply and transportation during World Wars
- Monnet-Plan 1945
- Helped editing the Schuman declaration in 1950 → ECSC
- 1955: foundation of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe
- 1976: Honorary Citizen of Europe

# Monnet's Vision of Europe

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“There will be no peace in Europe if States are reconstructed on the basis of **national sovereignty**, with all that implies in terms of **prestige politics and economic protectionism** [...] . The nations of Europe are too circumscribed to give their people the **prosperity** [...]

Prosperity and vital social progress will remain elusive until the nations of Europe form a **federation or a ‘European entity’** which will forge them into a **single economic unit.**” (Wells 2011: 85)

“**Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unissons des hommes.**” (Subtitle of his memoirs)

“**We are not uniting states, we are uniting people.**”

# Monnet's Influence

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
- **Monnet never ran for a political position**
- **Contribution through personal talks and networks → Monnet as charismatic, persistent and persuasive gentleman**
- **No great speaker → conversations and discussions in small groups**

“To promote and complete the text of our resolution, I travelled extensively the Community countries. In the French weekly *l'Express*, Marc Ullmann added up how many journeys I made in the early months of 1965: six to Bonn, four to Brussels, four to Rome, two to The Hague, and one to Luxembourg.” (Monnet 1978: 479)

“With all of them – political leaders, trade unionists, newspapermen – I liked to sit around the fire and talk about our underlying motives.” (Monnet 1978: 487)

# Narrative of The Hague

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# Monnet on the Outcome

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## Interview with RTL, 1969 (Boulay 2013):

“I think it would be difficult to imagine a conference that had better results than those of the Hague Conference.”

“**I am optimistic** because there is no choice and it is imperative. I do not know how Europe can hope to sort out its problems and **improve the standard of living** of its peoples without uniting and without creating not only a Common Market, but a European force that can not only help **satisfy their material needs** but help them **speak with one voice.**”

“I think that what has become very clear is the need for the six countries that form the European Economic Community to act together on every subject. [...] The Hague has borne witness to this **feeling** and to the need to unite and create a common programme.”



# Memoires (1976)

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**Table of contents:** 21 chapters, covering Ø 4.73 years

Chapitre 20 : LE TEMPS DE LA PATIENCE (1964-1972).

L'enlissement .....	563
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## Expectations before the Summit (letter to Willy Brandt):

“The transformation of the Common Market into an **economic and monetary union**, the beginnings of **political union**, and **negotiations with Britain** – all are possible” (Monnet 1978: 495)


## Outcomes?

“Brandt took the point; and he persuaded the Hague summit to adopt a plan for the economic and monetary union”

“The December 1969 summit removed other obstacles to progress. It was agreed to resume negotiations **with Great Britain.**” (Monnet 1978: 495)

## 2. *Edward Heath*

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# Edward Heath and Three Applications

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- 1960-1963: Head of the negotiation team
- 1967: Leader of the opposition
- 1970-1971: Prime Minister

# Reasons for Failure and Success of Accession Negotiations

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Reasons for failure:

- De Gaulle
- CAP
- American influence
- British strategy

Reasons for success:

- Compromises on CAP and Community budget
- Pompidou

# Link Narratives – Heath (1998) Memoirs

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## **Narrative report on the negotiation of 1960-1963:**

- Starting point for new negotiations
- Outcome of 1970-1971 heavily based on the position reached in 1963



## **No explicit thanks to his Chief Whip in Parliament:**

- Selection of decision rule crucial to reach the broadest consensus possible
- Chief Whip convinced Heath of the most appropriate decision rule

## **Importance of the Anglo-French Summit 1971**

# 3. Willy Brandt

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# Brandt on Europe and Germany

Whose narrative?	SPD 1946-mid 1960s (Hrbek 1972; Schmitz 1978; Hellmann 2010; Colschen 2010)	Brandt (1969a, b) back then	Brandt (1989) retrospectively
Category			
European integration	“the safest way of recovery and pacification of the European continent”	“We are determined ... to collaborate in a European peace order”	“[...] but I know very well that I was never dissuaded from the ideal way which is integration.”
German unity/reunification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “There’s no German question that it is not a European question as well.”</li> <li>• BUT reunification as the “fundamental concern”</li> <li>• “The German Reich must survive as a state and national whole.”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Germany is the home of all of us.”</li> <li>• avoids the term “reunification”</li> <li>• “Ostpolitik”: negotiations with the GDR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “But the confusion of terms was substantial. [...] Unity became reunification. [...] As if the whole problem was about the question how the affiliation of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany could or would be realized.”</li> <li>• “I considered the thesis of the principally undiminished continuity of the German Reich to be nonsense”</li> </ul>

# Brandt on the Role of The Hague

Whose narrative?	SPD 1946-mid 1960s (Hrbek 1972; Schmitz 1978; Hellmann 2010; Colschen 2010)	Brandt (1969a, b) back then	Brandt (1989) retrospectively
Category			
Way of integration & The Hague	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rejection of this kind of (Western) integration as an obstacle for reunification</li> <li>“socially substantiated strong Europe” instead of serving capitalist interests</li> <li>“Our aim has to be to incorporate all European nations in a common European cooperation”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Our country needs the collaboration and coordination with the West and understanding with the East”</li> <li>“The forthcoming conference of the Six in The Hague is of particular importance. ...”</li> <li>“European solidarity”</li> <li>“a structural element of a balanced pan-European peace order”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Our Ostpolitik had to start in the West!”</li> <li>“I helped, together with Georges Pompidou [...] to make the summit in The Hague become a success.”</li> <li>“My government assumed that the community had to be deepened and widened”</li> </ul>



# Conclusion

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**Monnet and Brandt perceived The Hague as being a key event of the history of the European integration process**

**In contrast, Heath did not focus extensively on The Hague summit**

- Resuming the accession negotiations
- But conditions to be fulfilled by the UK were already known in 1961

**“The summit of The Hague opened the door for the Communities to enlarge. Less than four years later, the UK, Ireland Denmark joined. Since then, ever more countries acceded to full membership of the European Communities, respectively European Union.” (Narrative 1)**